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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

Spencer Edward Cox appeals from the judgment 0f conviction entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine.

On

appeal, he challenges the denial

0f his motion to suppress.

Statement 0f Facts and Course 0f Proceedings

The

state

memorandum

adopts the following factual ﬁndings

made by

the

district

court in

order denying Cox’s motion to suppress:

On January

8,

2018,

at

approximately 1:48 a.m., Ofﬁcer Jason Green, with

was driving through the parking lot of the Super 8
hotel in Boise When he noticed What appeared t0 be a person sleeping in the
driver’s seat 0f a running four—door sedan. Earlier, around 11:00 p.m. 0n January
7, Ofﬁcer Green had noticed the same car pull into the parking lot and the
occupant did not emerge from the car. At approximately 12:30 a.m., Ofﬁcer
Green returned t0 the parking lot and noticed the same car located in a different
the Boise Police Department,

parking spot.

Thus,

when he

returned again at 1:48

am.

t0 see the car in yet

another parking spot with the engine running, he decided t0 investigate.

He had

previously been informed by Super 8 management that they did not Wish t0 have
anyone sleeping in their parking lot. This is a known high crime area and a

common

location 0f illegal drug transactions.

Ofﬁcer Green called Ofﬁcer Marshall Plaisted for

assistance.

They both

approached the car on foot and, While standing at the door, Ofﬁcer Green noticed
the driver’s seat was down and a male, later identiﬁed as Defendant, lying asleep
in the driver’s seat.
hilt

He

also noticed that there

was a small baseball bat with

the

of the bat next to Defendant’s hand as well as a large folding knife in between

While standing there, Ofﬁcer Green shined his ﬂashlight
and 0n Defendant, who did not respond. Ofﬁcer Johnson
then arrived on scene to assist. Ofﬁcer Johnson stood at the front passenger side
door While Ofﬁcer Plaisted stood at the rear driver’s side door.
his legs in his lap.

inside of the vehicle

its

Ofﬁcer Green then knocked on the driver’s side window with his
ﬂashlight. Defendant startled awake and opened the driver’s side doonm Ofﬁcer
Green asked him t0 place his hands on the steering Wheel. Defendant was quite
excitable, speaking quickly and acting agitated. Ofﬁcer Green had to continually
remind Defendant to keep his hands on the steering Wheel. Defendant appeared to
Ofﬁcer Green as though he was under the inﬂuence of a stimulant. Ofﬁcer Green
reached into the vehicle t0 remove the knife from between Defendant’s legs.

Once Ofﬁcer Green took the knife, he told Defendant he was going t0
remove him from the vehicle by holding his left hand. Ofﬁcer Green did so to
prevent Defendant from grabbing any additional weapons, such as the baseball
bat. Defendant stepped out While Ofﬁcer Green was holding his left hand and,
once out, Ofﬁcer Green then took Defendant’s right hand and held both hands
behind Defendant’s back While standing next t0 the open driver’s side door.
Ofﬁcer Green did not shut the driver’s side door after Defendant exited, nor did
Defendant ask him to shut the door other otherwise attempt t0 shut the door. It is
the practice of Boise Police Department ofﬁcers to “leave things as they lie,”

meaning

that if the ofﬁcer

subsequently close
leave

it

opens a door or Window to a vehicle, (s)he Will
opens the door or window, ofﬁcers will

If the detainee

it.

open unless asked

to close

it

by the detaineem

After Ofﬁcer Green performed a pat search for weapons, he had
Defendant walk to the front bumper of his patrol car. Once at the patrol car,
Ofﬁcer Green obtained the Defendant’s information verbally and ran it through
dispatch. While Ofﬁcer Green and the Defendant were standing next t0 his patrol

Ofﬁcer Plaisted walked his certiﬁed narcotic detection canine, Geno,
around the vehicle. Geno and Ofﬁcer Plaisted have been working together for
four years, although Ofﬁcer Plaisted has been a certiﬁed canine handler for seven
years. From his experience working with Geno, Ofﬁcer Plaisted is familiar with
vehicle,

1

There was conﬂicting testimony about

who opened

the door and

how

it

was opened.

The

audio/Video footage from Ofﬁcer Johnson’s body camera clearly reveals that Defendant opened

When Ofﬁcer Green knocked With

n0 time did Ofﬁcer Green,
on
the window and Defendant opened the door. Though Ofﬁcer Green testiﬁed that he may [have]
asked the Defendant t0 open the door, this clearly was not the case as is revealed by the Videos.
the door

his ﬂashlight.

Further, at

0r any of the other ofﬁcers, order Defendant to open the door. Rather, Ofﬁcer Green knocked

Ofﬁcer Green — Who was a canine ofﬁcer for several years — and Ofﬁcer Plaisted
testiﬁed that for purposes of an exterior canine sniff, it makes little difference whether a door or
Window is opened 0r closed. A trained drug detection canine’s sense of smell is sensitive such
2

Further,

that

its

ability to detect

odors

is

unaffected

by openings

to a vehicle.

Geno’s changes in behavior when he detects an odor 0f narcotics, including rapid
snifﬁng, head snapping towards the odor, closed mouth and drooling. Geno’s
ﬁnal response is t0 sit. T0 ensure that Geno’s sit is indeed a ﬁnal response,

Ofﬁcer Plaisted will attempt to direct Geno away from the odor.
seated, Ofﬁcer Plaisted knows the sit is an alert because Geno

If
is

Geno remains

trained to stay

With the odor.
Here, Ofﬁcer Plaisted approached Defendant’s vehicle With

saw

that

driver’s

it

was

still

door open.

running, With

all

the

He walked Geno

Geno commenced an

exterior sniff,

Windows

Geno and he

rolled up, the heater on,

and the

passenger side of the vehicle [where]
moving in a counter—clockwise direction while
t0 the

Ofﬁcer Plaisted walked beside him. As Geno rounded the front 0f the car, Geno
pulled hard on the leash towards the open door. Ofﬁcer Plaisted noticed a change
in Geno’s behavior at this point, as Geno began drooling and snifﬁng quickly,

Geno began
between the open door
and the interior compartment. Ofﬁcer Plaisted attempted t0 redirect Geno’s
attention, giving him another command t0 sniff. However, Geno’s head snapped
towards the interior 0f the vehicle, he sniffed along the driver’s ﬂoorboard and sat
down again. At no point did Geno actually get into the vehicle.

With his mouth closed and his head pulling toward the open door.
snifﬁng the driver’s door pocket and sat

down

in the area

Based upon Geno’s change in behavior and through his training and
experience, Ofﬁcer Plaisted knew this was an alert. Ofﬁcer Plaisted then looked
at the areas [Where] Geno had alerted and, in the driver’s door pocket, saw a pack
0f cigarettes. He opened the cigarette box and saw a small baggie that had a
crystal-like substance in it that later tested positive for methamphetamine.
(R.,

pp.70-72 (footnotes in original, but renumbered in

this brief);

ﬂ alﬂ

State’s Exhibit

1

(Ofﬁcer Green’s body camera Video), State’s Exhibit 2 (Ofﬁcer Plaisted’s body camera Video).)3

The

state

charged

Cox With

possession 0f methamphetamine, possession of drug

paraphernalia, and resisting and/or obstructing an ofﬁcer (for attempting to ﬂee from ofﬁcers

after

3

he was placed under

The

arrest).

augment the appellate record with the portion (between 0:35 and
body camera Video that the district court considered below. (2/20/19

parties also stipulated t0

0:43) 0f Ofﬁcer Johnson’s
Order).

(R., pp.25-26.)

Cox ﬁled
(R., pp.38-41.)

a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search 0f his vehicle.

In the motion,

Cox

asserted that the drug dog’s sniff of the interior 0f his vehicle

constituted a warrantless search and violated his Fourth

rights.

More

(Id.)

open door

speciﬁcally,

after ofﬁcers

t0 close the

Cox

Amendment and Idaho

asserted that because he

removed him and

led

him away from

had no opportunity

After a subsequent hearing on Cox’s motion to suppress

(Ct.

Citing State

V.

to close the

the vehicle, the ofﬁcers had a duty

door themselves prior t0 deploying the drug dog around the vehicle.

court denied the motion (R., pp.69-77).

Constitutional

(ﬂ

(Id.)

generally Tr.4), the district

Naranjo, 159 Idaho 258, 359 P.3d 1055

App. 2015), and numerous federal decisions holding

similarly, the court

concluded that the

ofﬁcers did not Violate Cox’s constitutional rights because the drug dog’s intrusion into the
vehicle

was

the culmination of an instinctual progression

passenger side 0f the vehicle.

Fourth

Amendment

Therefore, the court concluded, the sniff did not constitute a

t0 close the

door himself or request that the ofﬁcers do

Because

entered a conditional guilty plea t0 possession 0f methamphetamine, preserving his

it is

the hearing

(Id.)

(Id.)

right to challenge the district court’s denial

4

so.

concluded that the ofﬁcers had n0 afﬁrmative duty to close the door prior t0

deploying the drug dog.

COX

sniff’s initiation at the

search where Cox, and not the ofﬁcers, initially opened the vehicle door, and

Where Cox did not attempt
Finally, the court

(Id.)

from the

the only transcript cited

0n Cox’s motion

0f his motion t0 suppress.

by the

(R., pp.80-88.)

The

state

state in this brief, the state refers to the transcript

t0 suppress simply as “Tr.”

0f

agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (Id.) The district court imposed a unified seven-year
sentence with two years fixed. (R., pp.92-95.) Cox timely appealed. (R., pp.98-100.)

5

ISSUES

COX

states the issues

0n appeal

as:

Whether the ofﬁcers facilitated Geno’s entry into the car, such that the dog
interior was [a] warrantless search in Violation of the Fourth
Amendment, by not shutting the car door, which had been opened in response to
I.

sniff

of the

their knock.

II.

Alternatively, whether Article

provides

greater

protections

unreasonable searches

0f, the

I,

against

Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution
warrantless

protected interiors of cars

entries

into,

and

thus,

by drug dogs.

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

The

state rephrases the issue

Has COX

failed to

show

on appeal

as:

error in the district court’s denial 0f his

motion

t0 suppress?

ARGUMENT
COX Has
A.

Failed T0

Show Error In The

District Court’s Denial

Of His Motion To

Suppress

Introduction

Cox

contends that the

generally Appellant’s brief.)

district court erred in

Speciﬁcally,

Cox contends

concluding that the ofﬁcers did not Violate the Fourth
pp.7-14.)

Further,

Cox contends

contention that the search

Cox’s arguments

was

fail.

(E

denying his motion to suppress.
that

Amendment

that the district court erred

the

district

court

erred in

in searching his vehicle.

by not speciﬁcally

ruling

(Id.,

on

his

also unlawful pursuant t0 the Idaho Constitution. (1d,, pp. 14-22.)

A review 0f the record and applicable caselaw supports the district

court’s conclusion that the drug dog’s intrusion into Cox’s vehicle did not constitute a Fourth

Amendment

search.

Further, a review 0f the record reveals that the district court impliedly

rejected Cox’s Idaho Constitution claim, and in any event, that

Cox has

failed to demonstrate that

the ofﬁcers’ actions violated the Idaho Constitution.

B.

Standard

Of Review

In reviewing a decision

court’s

0n a motion

t0 suppress, the appellate court accepts the trial

ﬁndings 0f fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the

application of constitutional principles to those facts. State

739, 741 (2007).

V.

Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d

The
The

C.

District

Court Correctly Concluded That The Drug Dog’s Instinctive Act

Interior Portions

Violate Cox’s Fourth

Of Entering
Was Not A Fourth Amendment Search And Did Not

Of The Vehicle
Amendment Rights

The Fourth Amendment 0f the United

States Constitution provides that “[t]he right 0f the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches

and

seizures, shall not

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

be violated.”

Warrantless searches are “per se

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few speciﬁcally established and

Katz

well-delineated exceptions.”

V.

exception to the warrant requirement
searches of vehicles

When

there

is

or evidence of criminal activity.

United
is

States,

389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

the “automobile exception,”

One such

Which allows warrantless

probable cause t0 believe that the vehicle contains contraband

E

California

V.

Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 (1991); State

V.

Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999).

Law

enforcement

may

deploy a drug dog to sniff the exterior of a lawfully stopped

vehicle without suspicion of drug activity so long as doing so does not prolong the detention

beyond what
(2005); State

“When

is

necessary t0 effectuate the purpose of the stop.

Illinois V. Caballes,

543 U.S. 405

Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183-184, 125 P.3d 536, 539-540 (Ct. App. 2005).

V.

a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile contains the

odor of controlled substances, the ofﬁcer has probable cause t0 believe that there are drugs in the
automobile and

may

search

it

Without a warrant.” State

P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State

(Ct.

App. 2005)).

V.

V.

Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172

Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 281, 108 P.3d 424, 428

In this case, the district court denied Cox’s motion to suppress after concluding that the

drug dog’s partial entry into the interior portion of the vehicle did not constitute a Fourth

Amendment

search.

Speciﬁcally, the court concluded that the dog’s entry

(R., pp.69-77.)

constituted an instinctual progression

and

that the ofﬁcers

opened prior

t0 the deploying

vehicle,

from the

sniff’s initiation at the

had n0 afﬁrmative duty
0f the drug dog.

t0 close the

door that

spontaneously

moved

presence 0f narcotics.
the ofﬁcers,

(R., pp.72-73.)

his

COX had

initially

(Id.)

In reaching this conclusion, the district court properly relied

258, 359 P.3d 1055.

passenger side 0f the

upon

Mg,

159 Idaho

In that case, during a trafﬁc stop, a deployed drug

head up and into the vehicle’s open Window and then alerted

m,

159 Idaho

had opened the Window

259-260, 359 P.3d

at

in the course

at

of the trafﬁc

dog

to the

1056-1057. Naranjo, and not

stop.

The Idaho Court of

Li.

Appeals held that the dog’s intrusion through the Window did not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search because the dog instinctively, without facilitation from the ofﬁcer, followed an odor into

Naranjo’s vehicle. Li. at 259-261, 359 P.3d at 1056-1058.

Both the
in

m,

159 Idaho

Which have held

pp.73 n.4, 74-75, 75 n.5), and the Court

district court in this case (R.,

at

260-261, 359 P.3d

similarly.

at

In United States

1057-1058, cited numerous federal appellate cases

V.

Lyons, 486 F.3d 367, 369-370, 372-374

2007), ofﬁcers approached the passenger side 0f Lyons’ vehicle during a trafﬁc stop.

Lyons’ passenger opened the passenger side
the ofﬁcer.

Li. at 373.

passenger—side

A deployed drug dog

Window and

alerted.

oprpeals

window without any speciﬁc

(8th Cir.

Li

at 369.

order or request from

subsequently stuck his head through this still-open

Li. at 370.

The Eighth

Circuit Court 0f Appeals rejected

Lyons’ argument (similar to the argument made by

Cox

Window by

created the opportunity for the dog intrusion into the

impliedly requiring
to close the

him

window

prior t0 deploying a drug

was misplaced because,

door, took the drug

dog off

smell the interior 0f the van.
merely, in the words 0f the
the

dog

to stick his

detaining Lyons and thus

or his passenger to open the Window, the ofﬁcers had an afﬁrmative duty

dog

to sniff the exterior

Court found that Lyons’ reliance 0n United States
(10th Cir. 1998),

in this case), that because the ofﬁcers

its

V.

of the

in that case, the

oﬁcers opened the

This was different than the facts in

trial court,

at 373.

I_d.

The

Winningham, 140 F.3d 1328, 1329-1330

leash near the open door, and allowed the

Li.

car.

head through the vehicle’s window.

Li.

dog

m

“took the situation as [they] found

it,”

Thus, as in

Circuit Court of Appeals held that the drug dog’s intrusion into the vehicle

vehicle’s sliding

to

jump

in

and

where the ofﬁcers
and did not

m,
was

direct

the Eighth

instinctive

and

did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Li. at 373-374.

As

noted,

numerous other

Idaho Court 0f Appeals in
F.3d 616, 620

(6th Cir.

open window without
acts

federal cases cited

mp, have

the district court in this case, and

held similarly.

2012) (ﬁnding no Fourth
facilitation

by

ﬂ, gg, United States

Amendment

search

V.

When dog jumped through

by police because “absent police misconduct,

622 F.3d 209, 214

(3rd Cir.

2010) (ﬁnding no Fourth

the instinctive

Amendment

M

search When,

without facilitation by police, dog instinctively entered car door that defendant opened and

open

after ofﬁcers

asked him to leave vehicle, and noting that in

left

this context, “instinctive”

implies that the dog “enters the car Without assistance, facilitation, or other intentional action

10

the

Sharp, 689

of trained canines...do[] not Violate the Fourth Amendment”) (citation omitted);

States V. Pierce,

by

by

its

handler”); United States

Amendment

search

V.

Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362-364 (10th Cir. 1989) (ﬁnding

When dog jumped

was not opened

in hatchback that

n0 Fourth

for the purpose

permitting dog to enter, and police did not otherwise encourage entry); United States

Hutchinson, 471 F.Supp.2d 497, 510-511

Where drug dog entered car window

(MD.

had opened Without

facilitation

equating the scenario with the plain smell/plain View doctrines); United States

WL

11396770 *5 (D. Kan. 2008)

similar circumstances);

ﬂ

(citing Stone

also Felders ex

rel.

WL

V.

from ofﬁcer,

Woods, 2008

and ﬁnding no Fourth Amendment search in

Smedley

V.

Malcom, 755 F.3d 870, 880

2014) (collecting cases); compare Winningham, 140 F.3d

Armenta, 2010

V.

no Fourth Amendment search

Pa. 2007) (ﬁnding

that suspect

0f

at

1331; United States

(10th Cir.

V.

Gastelo-

1440451 *21-23 (D. Neb. 2010) (ﬁnding Fourth Amendment search where

ofﬁcer opened car doors, ordered occupants out, shut one car door but deliberately

left

another

open, and Where canine ofﬁcer instructed dog t0 enter vehicle through open door).

As

in these cases, there

was no Fourth Amendment search

himself opened the car door, and the ofﬁcers did not
interior portions

fact, closer

of the vehicle.

Some of the

questions than presented

by

facilitate the

cases relied

this case.

upon by

Unlike in

in the present case.

Cox

drug dog’s intrusion into the

the district court presented, in

m5

and

m,

the drug

dog

in

the present case exhibited behaviors consistent with alerting prior t0 entering the interior portion

of the vehicle, and thus was clearly following the scent 0f an odor into the vehicle.

5

In Naranjo, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that

before entering a vehicle

is

it

“[did] not believe a drug dog’s behavior

constitutionally significant.”

P.3d at 1057-1058.
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(R., pp.71-

Naranjo, 159 Idaho at 260-261, 359

Further, unlike in

72.)

m, m,

and

minimal — the dog did not jump entirely
motion

m,

the drug dog’s intrusion into the car

into the car.

district court

appeal,

Cox

ﬁrst asserts that

two of the

district court’s factual

erroneous and not supported by substantial evidence.

ﬁnding

asserts that the court’s factual

dog pulling

his

(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-9.)

ﬁnding

that

Second,

COX

“voluntarily opened the door for ofﬁcers”

was

car.”

Cox

(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.)

clearly erroneous because, while the ofﬁcers did not verbally ask

asserts, “actually did

Cox

make

a nonverbal request

notes that few citizens

(emphasis in original).)

memorandum

into the vehicle”

nose across the threshold of the vehicle, and entering the “negative space

asserts that the court’s factual

request that

he

First,

from one of the ofﬁcer’s body cameras shows the drug

between the [open] door and the body 0f the

Cox

ﬁndings were clearly

n0 point did Geno actually get

that “[a]t

clearly erroneous because the Video

Green,

properly denied Cox’s

t0 suppress.

On

was

The

was

would

COX

by knocking on

feel free t0 ignore.

Both of these contentions

fail

open the door, Ofﬁcer

t0

the Window,” a

(Appellant’s brief, p.9

because a review 0f the

denial order clearly demonstrates that the court understood

district court’s

What was depicted

in

the Videos in both instances.

When
is

the district court stated that the drug

clear that the court

m,

meant

that the

dog did

dog did not “actually get

not, unlike the

drug dogs in

into the vehicle,”

m, m,

fully enter the vehicle, but instead merely crossed the threshold of the

it

and

open door.

Immediately prior t0 the factual ﬁnding in question, the court stated that the drug dog “sat down
in the area

between the open door and

interior

compartment,” and “snapped towards the interior

12

and the vehicle” and “sniffed along the driver’s ﬂoorboard.”
court’s entire legal analysis

and reliance upon the caselaw discussed above was based upon the

drug dog’s intrusion into the vehicle.

p.8.),

is

Further, the district

(R., p.72.)

(R., pp.72-76.)

While Cox, 0n appeal (Appellant’s

emphasizes the privacy interest in the space between the open door and the door

of n0 signiﬁcance in

the car

itself,

pp.71-72;

this case

because the drug dog clearly intruded into both

and because the ofﬁcer did not encourage the dog’s intrusion

ﬂ alﬂ

Likewise,

itself, this

this area

and

into

into either area (R.,

State’s Exhibit 2, 5:41-6:11).

it is

clear that the district court’s statement that

door for officers,” was limited t0 factual ﬁndings

opened the door; and
understood that

brief,

that: (1)

(2) ofﬁcers did not directly order

COX opened

COX

“voluntarily opened the

Cox, and not the ofﬁcers, physically

Cox

to

open the door.

the door in response t0 the ofﬁcers knocking

The court

on the window.

(R.,

pp.70, 75.)

Cox

also frames the alleged involuntary nature of his opening 0f the car door in the

context of his legal argument that the ofﬁcers ultimately facilitated the drug dog’s intrusion into
the vehicle

Cox

by “nonverbally” compelling him

also appears to attempt to distinguish

arguing

that, after

When he was

to

open the car door. (Appellant’s

NLan'Q and

brief, pp.

1

1-13.)

the federal cases discussed above

by

he was compelled t0 open the door, he had no practical opportunity t0 close

ordered to leave the vehicle, and then led immediately

away from

it

the vehicle.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-14.)

Initially,

door, 0r

the state asserts that Whether or not

had a subsequent opportunity

to close

it,

13

is

COX

felt

he was compelled t0 open the car

0f no constitutional signiﬁcance in

this case,

and

that the district court’s analysis

upon by the

district court in this

trafﬁc stop36

—

of these factors was unnecessary.

case and

the Idaho Court of Appeals in

by

scenarios Where a detained vehicle occupant, like Cox,

compelled to open the door or window upon the ofﬁcer’s approach.
did the courts

ﬁnd

that these lawful trafﬁc stops,

from them, imposed a duty upon the ofﬁcers
to deploying a

drug dog.

Fourth
t0

do

Still,

in

relied

NLan'g involved
would

likely feel

none of these cases

and the open doors or windows

to close the

that resulted

open door or window themselves prior

Likewise, none of these cases turned on the degree of a suspect’s

opportunity or lack thereof to close the door or

A

Each 0f the cases

Window prior t0 deploying the drug

dog.

drug dog’s instinctive intrusion into an open car door 0r Window only constitutes a

Amendment

so), for the

search where: (1) an ofﬁcer opens the door 0r

purpose of

window

(or orders the suspect

drug dog’s intrusion; (2) the ofﬁcer encourages the

facilitating the

drug dog t0 cross the threshold into the vehicle; 0r (3) the ofﬁcer commits some other

misconduct to

facilitate the

drug dog’s intrusion.

A car

door or window opened by a detained

vehicle occupant in the context of a trafﬁc stop 0r other lawful detention does not improperly

facilitate

a subsequent drug dog’s intrusion into the vehicle, and an ofﬁcer deploying a drug dog

may, as Ofﬁcer Green testiﬁed was his policy (TL, p.22, L.17 — p.23, L.5), “leave
it.”

ﬂ

rely

0n a dog’s

6

Felders ex.

rel.

Smedlev, 755 F.3d

alert t0 establish

at

880

probable cause

Cox

(“[I]t is...well-established that

if the

it

as they left

ofﬁcers cannot

ofﬁcers open part 0f the vehicle so the dog

initial detention of him and the
testiﬁed
that he considered COX to
Ofﬁcer
Green
it,
be detained 0n suspicion of disorderly conduct as soon as he observed Cox sleeping in the

In the present case, though

district court

did not challenge the ofﬁcers’

correspondingly did not analyze

vehicle. (TL, p.30, L.24

— p.31,

L.10.)
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may

enter the vehicle or otherwise facilitate

(“There

to

entry”) (emphasis added);

no evidence, nor does Stone contend,

is

hatchback so the dog couldjump

dog

its

jump

in.

Nor

is

Amendment

866 F.2d

at

363

asked Stone t0 open the

that the police

there any evidence the police handler encouraged the

in the can”) (emphasis added);

ofﬁcers conducted Fourth

m,

Winningham, 140 F.3d

at

1329-1331 (holding that

search When, after occupants were already

removed from

van, ofﬁcers opened van door, deployed unleashed drug dog near the open door, and the dog

jumped

into the vehicle).

Even

if there is constitutional

signiﬁcance t0 a detained vehicle occupant’s opportunity t0

close an open door 0r

Window

opportunity in this case.

Cox could have chosen

prior t0 the deployment 0f a drug dog,

t0 fully or partially

than his car door, and then could have attempted t0 close the
the vehicle.

Cox

to exit the car

—

also could

have requested

open

Cox had such an

his car

window

Window upon being ordered

that ofﬁcers close his car

door

after

rather

to exit

he was ordered

a request that Ofﬁcer Green testiﬁed he has “no issue” granting.

(Tn, p.24,

Ls.17-20.)
Further, even if Cox

manner

in

had a

relatively

more limited opportunity t0

which he was removed and led away from the

close the door due to the

car, the ofﬁcers’ actions resulting in this

limited opportunity were reasonable. Before even knocking

on the car Window, the approaching

ofﬁcer observed two weapons in Cox’s Vicinity — a small baseball bat next t0 Cox’s hand and a
large folding knife in

Window, COX was
his

between his legs on

his lap.

agitated, continuously failed t0

(R., p.70.)

After the ofﬁcer knocked 0n the

comply With Ofﬁcer Green’s request

t0

keep

hands 0n the steering Wheel, and appeared to Ofﬁcer Green t0 be under the inﬂuence 0f a

15

(R., pp.70-71.)

stimulant.

reasonably removed

Cox
his Fourth

Amendment

The

D.

Cox from

the vehicle and led

has failed t0 show that the

show

failed t0

In light 0f these factors posing a threat to their safety, the ofﬁcers

district court erred in

rights in obtaining the contraband

that the district court erred in

District

Provided

him away.
concluding that the ofﬁcers violated

from

Cox

his vehicle.

has therefore

denying his motion to suppress.

Court Implicitlv Reiected Cox’s Assertion That The Idaho Constitution

Him More Protection Than The Fourth Amendment
And Cox Has Failed T0 Demonstrate That The

This Case,

In the Circumstances

Of

District Court Erred In

Reaching This Conclusion

The Idaho

Constitution, like the United States Constitution, protects individuals against

unreasonable government searches.

Idaho Const.

art. I,

§ 17 (“[t]he right

of the people t0 be

secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not

be violated”).

m

Idaho appellate courts are free t0 extend greater protections under the state constitution
than those granted by the United States Supreme Court under the federal constitution.

Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748, 760 P.2d 1162, 1164 (1988) (holding

that the installation

0f a

“pen register” 0n suspect’s telephone was a search within the meaning 0f the Idaho Constitution);

ﬂ

also State

State V.

V.

Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254

P.

788 (1927) (early adoption of exclusionary

Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992)

t0 exclusionary rule); State V. Pettit,

(declining to adopt

“good

faith” exception

162 Idaho 849, 854-855, 406 P.3d 370, 375-376

2017) (declining t0 adopt reasonable mistake of law exception to exclusionary

16

rule);

rule).

(Ct.

App.

Although the United States Supreme Court establishes no more than the ﬂoor 0f
constitutional protection, the Idaho

rule 0f

Supreme Court has found

law applicable Within the borders of our

Amendment

or

its

counterpart

—

Article

I,

§ 17

state,

there

is

“merit in having the same

whether an interpretation of the Fourth

of the Idaho Constitution —

consistency makes sense to the police and the public.” State

V.

is

involved. Such

Charpentier, 131 Idaho 649, 653,

962 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1998). Indeed “When interpreting the Idaho Constitution,

this

Court will

use federal rules and methodology unless clear precedent or circumstances unique t0 the state of

Idaho or

its

constitution indicates that Idaho’s constitution provides greater protection than the

analogous federal provision”).

CDA Dairy Queen Inc., V.

State Insurance Fund, 154 Idaho 379,

384, 299 P.3d 186, 191 (2013).
Several neutral, nonexclusive criteria

may be examined when

divergence between federal and state constitutional law.

language of the

These

state law; 5) differences in structure

between the federal and

Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 825 P.2d 501 (1992)

Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812-813 (Wash. 1986));
5, 8

ﬂ

made

for a

1) the textual

4) preexisting

state constitutions; 6) matters

and

(Bistline,

also State

is

of parallel provisions of

common law history;

particular state interest or local concern; 7) public attitudes;

P.3d

criteria include:

state constitution; 2) signiﬁcant differences in the text

the federal and state constitutions; 3) state constitutional and

State V.

an argument

V.

8) state traditions.

J.,

E,

concurring) (citing

0f

w
1g”

Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 472, 20

(2001) (noting that instances, t0 that point, 0f the Idaho Constitution providing more

protection than the United States Constitution

was because of the “uniqueness 0f our

Constitution, and our long-standing jurisprudence.”)
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state,

our

In his motion to

Amendment and
vehicle.

Article

(R., pp.38-39.)

suppress,

I,

§ 17

Cox argued

However, Cox did not argue,

ﬁrst time, that Article

Ls.11-14.)

I,

§ 17

in the motion, that the Idaho Constitution

Amendment

Near the conclusion of the hearing 0n

R., pp.38-48.)

ofﬁcers violated both the Fourth

of the Idaho Constitution in obtaining the contraband from his

provided greater protection than the Fourth

p.62,

that the

in the circumstances

the motion t0 suppress,

provided more protection “against

In support 0f the proposition,

Cox

this type

254

P.

installation

COX

this case.

(E

argued, for the

of intrusion.”

(TL,

referenced the fact that the Idaho

exclusionary rule existed before the equivalent federal constitutional rule,

43,

of

ﬂ M,

44 Idaho

788; and cited Thompson, 114 Idaho at 748, 760 P.2d 1164 (1988) (holding that the

of a “pen register” on suspect’s telephone was a search within the meaning 0f the

Idaho Constitution).

(T11,

p.62, L.11

—

p.63, L.13).

COX

did not argue that there

was anything

uniquely state-speciﬁc about the constitutional issue presented, or that Idaho appellate precedent
speciﬁcally supported his position.7

it

was “not aware,

(E Q.)

When

the district court skeptically expressed that

in this setting, [of] anything particularly different” With respect to the Idaho

Constitution, Cox’s counsel replied that “it’s not necessarily precedent,

guess

is

how

I

would

clarify that.”

reference the Idaho Constitution in

(TL, p.63, Ls.3-13.)

its

The

it’s

district court

more argument

I

did not speciﬁcally

order denying Cox’s motion t0 suppress.

(ﬂ R., pp.69-

77.)

7

While Cox’s attorney did express an asserted anecdotal observation that she has seen “more and
more exterior K9 sniffs with vehicle doors left open” (Tr., p.63, Ls.15-21), this did not constitute
evidence 0f some Idaho-speciﬁc reason t0 interpret the Idaho Constitution differently than the
Fourth Amendment in this context.
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On

appeal,

Cox

argues that this case should be remanded so that the district court can

consider the Idaho Constitution issue.

this

Court reach the issue,

it

He

(Appellant’s brief, pp.14-16.)

also argues that should

should conclude that the Idaho Constitution provides greater

protections than the United States Constitution in the circumstances of this case, and that the

ofﬁcers violated his Idaho Constitutional rights in obtaining the contraband.
pp.16-22.)

However, a review 0f the record reveals no remand

court’s denial order constituted an implicit rejection

Further,

Cox

is

(Appellant’s brief,

necessary because the

district

0f the arguments Cox actually raised t0

it.

has failed t0 show that the court erred in this implicit conclusion that the ofﬁcer’s

actions violated the Idaho Constitution.

The

district court’s denial

order constituted an implicit denial of Cox’s argument raised

under the Idaho Constitution. As noted, the argument COX made in his motion t0 suppress and
the hearing at the motion to suppress

was

0n appeal. Because Cox provided the

district court

substantially less detailed than the one he

no “cogent reason

why

now

at

raises

our state constitution

m

should have been applied differently than the Fourth Amendment with the search involved here,”
the district court properly responded to the argument

m,

implicitly rejecting

133 Idaho 126, 130, 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999);

406-407, 825 P.2d
greater

by

protection

at

503-504 (declining to consider claim

absent

dismissing Cox’s argument
the argument.

E

Lester

V.

supporting

at the

argument).

hearing

made

ﬂ alﬂ

it.

m

Wheaten, 121 Idaho

at

that the Idaho Constitution affords

Further,

the

clear that the court

district

court’s

statements

had considered, and

rejected,

Salvino, 141 Idaho 937, 941, 120 P.3d 755 (Ct. App. 2005) (“While

the court does not explicitly state

its

ﬁnding

that

19

Ramsden

failed to

make

a reasonable inquiry

into the facts

and

in its

and legal theories,

memorandum

COX

it is

from the

clear

district court’s

decision and order that the ﬁnding

was

statements at the two hearings

implicitly made.”).

8

has failed t0 demonstrate that the district court erred in implicitly denying his Idaho

Constitutional claim.

On

Cox

appeal,

purported interpretation ofArticle
things: (1) the holding in

PC_ttit,

I,

has substantially expanded his argument t0 assert that his

§ 17

of the Idaho Constitution

162 Idaho

at

854-855, 406 P.3d

at

is

supported by,

among

other

375-376, in Which the Idaho

Court of Appeals declined t0 adopt the reasonable mistake of law exception to the exclusionary
rule,

and instead provided

relief t0 a defendant-appellant

even though the ofﬁcer’s actions were

reasonable; (2) his proposition that the analysis utilized in the related federal cases “appears to

run contrary to several fundamental legal principles,” including that

it

turns

on an evaluation of

the ofﬁcer’s subjective intentions; and (3) his proposition that the analysis utilized in the related
federal cases does not account for the

to act instinctively

their handlers.

when,

documented concern

in fact, they are actually reacting to subconscious or subtle cues

(Appellant’s brief pp.16-22.)

Constitution provided

that trained animals will only appear

him

COX

from

has failed t0 demonstrate that the Idaho

greater protections in the circumstances 0f this case, and thus, for the

reasons discussed above, has necessarily failed to demonstrate that the ofﬁcers violated the Idaho
Constitution in obtaining the contraband from his vehicle.

8

Even

if the district court’s denial

Constitutional claim, this Court
case.

Cox

has already had a

order did not constitute an implicit denial 0f Cox’s Idaho

may

full

still

consider the issue 0n appeal rather than remand the

opportunity to legally and factually develop this argument

before the district court, and this Court freely applies constitutional principles to facts found by
the district court.
144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 741.

M,
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The Idaho Court of Appeals’ holding
because

it

in Pe_ttit has

no application

addressed a completely different constitutional question. In

Appeals relied upon State

V.

Supreme Court held

that the

Idaho Constitution.

Pe_ttit,

Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660
good

to the current case

Pe_ttit,

the Idaho Court of

(1992), in

which the Idaho

m

faith exception t0 the exclusionary rule did not

162 Idaho

at

854-855, 406 P.3d

at

375-376. Both

apply under the

and

PC_ttit

recognized the existence of an independent Idaho exclusionary rule, Which was established long
before

its

406 P.3d
however,

federal counterpart in

at

is

375-376;
not

m,

about

the

ﬂgul,

44 Idaho 43, 254

122 Idaho
remedies

at

P.

788.

984-998, 842 P.2d

available

t0

a

Pe_ttit,

at

criminal

162 Idaho

663-677.

854-855;

The present

defendant

unconstitutional privacy intrusion at the hands of a well-meaning ofﬁcer.

at

subject

would be completely removed from

I,

§

t0

The present case

about Whether a particular search implicates the constitution in the ﬁrst place. Further,

proposed interpretation of Article

case,

if

an
is

Cox’s

17 0f the Idaho Constitution were adopted, this issue

the underlying Pettit/Guzman rationale of providing relief to

defendants for well-meaning ofﬁcers” mistakes

—

as ofﬁcers

would then be on notice 0f

their

afﬁrmative duty t0 close car doors and Windows in circumstances similar t0 this case; and future
Violations 0f this constitutional provision

would not be Viewed

as reasonable mistakes 0r well-

intentioned errors.

Next, the fact that the analyses set forth by the federal cases relied upon by the
court in this case

may examine

an ofﬁcer’s subjective intent

is not: (1)

a necessary part of the

analysis of these types of cases; (2) “contrary” to fundamental legal principles

21

district

when

it

does

occur; or (3) offer justiﬁcation for a different interpretation of Article

I,

17 of the Idaho

§

Constitution.

While the nature 0f a
0f the related federal cases),

When

particular challenge raised under the

may

mag, the

instead based

vehicle;

and

its

that

instinctively

is

not necessarily the case.

Court of Appeals did not analyze any ofﬁcer’s subjective

holding 0n the fact that Naranjo, and not the ofﬁcer, opened the

was n0

When

it

that

include an examination of an ofﬁcer’s subj ective intent (such as

the defendant-appellant alleges ofﬁcer misconduct), this

example, in

Imp framework (and

indication in the record that the drug

crossed the threshold 0f the Window.

intent,

For

and

window of the

dog was doing anything but acting

mm,

159 Idaho

at

259-261, 359

P.3d at 1056-1058.

While COX
Fourth

Amendment
when

such intent

is

correct that the subjective intent of the ofﬁcer

analysis,

it is

not always so, and

is

usually irrelevant t0 a

not necessarily “improper” to consider

it is

a particular constitutional question reasonably requires

United States Supreme Court has held that an ofﬁcer’s

failure t0 provide

it.

Miranda9 warnings does

not render subsequent warned admissions inadmissible unless the ofﬁcers
decision to

employ a “question-ﬁrst”

soliciting incriminating statements.

State V.

Doe, 163 Idaho 323, 329

9

Miranda

V.

Missouri

n.2,

Examining an ofﬁcer’s subjective

strategy to withhold

V.

Seibert,

For example, the

made

a conscious

Miranda warnings for the purposes 0f

542 U.S. 600, 604-616 (2004);

413 P.3d 424, 430 n.2

(Ct.

App. 2017) (applying

ﬂ

211$

Seibert).

intent is thus occasionally appropriate in order to apply a

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996).

22

and

constitutional provision

t0

reveal the existence of a constitutional Violation.

In the

circumstances of the present case and in some of the related federal cases cited above, Where an

ofﬁcer

may have

the authority t0 detain a vehicle occupant and

0r window, an examination of the ofﬁcer’s subjective intent

compel him

may be

to

open the car door

necessary to reveal whether

the ofﬁcer’s otherwise-lawful actions are, in fact, unlawful (such as if an ofﬁcer opens a door, or

orders a door to be opened 0r left open, speciﬁcally for the purpose of subsequently deploying a

drug dog in the interior of a vehicle).
demonstrate that there

is

Further,

and in any event, Cox has not attempted

anything about analyzing an ofﬁcer’s subjective intentions that

odds With Idaho’s particular jurisprudence 0r unique characteristics.
472, 20 P.3d at

COX

“documented concern

that trained animals Will only appear to act instinctively,

T0 the

contrary,

Supreme Court opinion

it

in Caballes,

alerts

P.2d 949, 953 (1991); State

V.

their handlers.”

in Idaho,

when

at

in fact, they

(E Appellant’s brief,

even before the United States

543 U.S. 405, that probable cause for a vehicle search

on the vehicle.

is

State V. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898, 821

Martinez, 129 Idaho 426, 432, 925 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Ct. App.

Further, Cox’s concern that the drug

dog be

requirement 0f such searches. Florida

that a particular

from

was long-established

developed when a drug dog

Amendment

135 Idaho

has not attempted to establish an Idaho-speciﬁc connection to the

are actually reacting to subconscious 0r subtle cues

1996).

is at

8.

Likewise,

pp.18-19.)

E M,

to

V.

reliable is already a threshold Fourth

Harris,

568 U.S. 237 (2013). Challenges

drug dog, 0r that drug dogs in general, “Will only appear t0 act instinctively,”

may be made under

existing Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence

23

relating to drug dogs.

I_d.

Thus,

Cox

has identiﬁed no particular weakness in this jurisprudence that requires greater protection

under the Idaho Constitution.

Cox

has

failed

to

10

demonstrate that the Idaho

Constitution provided

protections than the United States Constitution in the circumstances of this case.“

reasons discussed above as t0

Why

the ofﬁcers did not Violate Cox’s Fourth

him
For

greater

all

Amendment

of the
rights,

the ofﬁcers likewise did not Violate Cox’s rights under the Idaho Constitution. This Court should

therefore

afﬁrm the

district court’s

order denying Cox’s motion t0 suppress.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

Court afﬁrm Cox’s judgment of conviction and

the district court’s denial 0f Cox’s motion t0 suppress.

DATED this

6th day 0f June, 2019.

Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
/s/

Deputy Attorney General

10

Additionally, t0 the extent

COX

supports his argument With evidence not presented t0 the

trial

court (law review articles critiquing the general reliability of drug dogs) (Appellant’s brief, pp.1819), this

Court should not consider

this evidence.

State V. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374,

376

n.1,

859

P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (In rendering a decision 0n the issues raised on appeal, the
appellate court is “limited to review of the record made below” and “will not consider new

evidence that was never before the
11

With respect

t0

state asserts that

trial

court”)

any other arguments made by Cox pertaining

Cox

relevant issues in this case, as set forth
therein, is at

t0 the

has failed t0 demonstrate that the Fourth

by

Idaho Constitution, the

Amendment

analysis 0f the

the state in this brief and the federal cases cited

odds With Idaho’s particular jurisprudence 0r unique characteristics.
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I

HEREBY CERTIFY

that

copy of the foregoing BRIEF
iCourt File and Serve:

OF

I

day of June, 2019, served a true and correct
RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means 0f
have

this 6th

BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Mark W. Olson

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

MWO/dd
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